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A common view of administrations is that they are eager to expand their influence by 
resorting to a wide range of tools, ranging from technical expertise to the budget (Niskanen, 
1971).  The Commission is no exception to the rule: it is often described in the press or by 
politicians as a bunch of power-hungry officials – ‘technocrates européistes’ in the words of 
former French foreign minister Hubert Védrine (Le Monde, 29 June 2010); “self-serving 
bureaucracy” in those of German center-right MEP Ingebord Grässle (European Voice, 29 
July 2010), and there is no shortage of works in the scholarly literature to describe it as a 
‘utility maximizer’ eager to expand its influence (Pollack 2003),  a ‘purposeful opportunist’ 
trying to draw maximum benefit of its often limited powers (Cram, 1993, Héritier, 1999), or 
to criticize the continuous erosion of national powers it is conducting as a form of ‘integration 
by stealth’, undesired either by its political principals (the member states) or by citizens  
(Majone, 2005). 
 
It is fair to say that the Commission has at its disposal a wider range of resources than 
the secretariat of most international organizations. The treaty invites it to act independently 
from external pressures; so does its official institutional ideology, the ‘Community method’ 
(CM), designed by the founders of the EU (Dehousse, 2011). Its broad formal powers include 
a near-monopoly of legislative initiative and the discretionary power to bring about 
infringement proceedings against member states that fail to comply with EU law – two 
important prerogatives in their own right that, when skilfully combined, enable it to play a 
leading role in legislative procedures (Schmidt, 2011). Unlike the Council, its members (in 
the college and in the services) are working full-time on European issues, and it is better 
equipped than either the Council or the Parliament to have a cross-cutting view on the wide 
range of policies conducted or affected by the Union. Last but not least, given the limited 
development of party politics at the European level, it is also less bothered than its domestic 
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counterparts by purely political considerations. This explains why the Community method has 
always been defended by the Commission leadership. Even President Barroso, often 
suspected of revisionist leanings, systematically pays lip service to it. Reacting to the 
multiplication of French and German unilateral initiatives during the financial crisis, he 
notably stressed that the best guarantee for "preserving the coherence" of EU action was the 
Community method, involving the European Commission as the guardian of the EU Treaties 
to prevent possible divisions (Barroso, 2011).  
 
In this chapter, we assess what is left of the Community method “myth” 
(Dimitrakopoulos, 2010) in the beliefs of Commission officials, after nearly two decades of 
an evolution characterized by a number of powerful challenges to the latter’s authority. In 
contrast with chapter 3, we do not purport to provide the reader with an overall map of 
official’s beliefs, but merely to analyze whether officials are still inspired by the classical 
view of their institution’s role, and how they envisage its relationships with other institutions 
and actors We begin by  recalling the main changes that have taken place in the governance of 
the EU in the period following the Maastricht Treaty (1992), as this forms the background 
against which we must assess officials’ current views.  We then analyze how large support for 
the Community method is in today’s Commission, and discuss a number of factors that might 
affect it. Finally, we examine CM supporters’ views on thje evolution of the EU institutional 
system. 
 
1. THE POST-MAASTRICHT ENVIRONMENT 
 
 From the Maastricht Treaty on, the European Commission, which was long regarded 
as the main engine of integration, has lost substantial ground . Even though its formal powers 
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have not been curtailed, its authority has been challenged in various ways. From the 
beginning of the 1990s on, the level of support has collapsed;  opinion polls have 
unanimously confirmed the fact that the ‘permissive consensus’ that enabled the European 
venture to be launched is now nothing but a memory (Hooghe and Marks, 2009) . Around the 
same time, the national governments began to show signs of growing impatience with what 
they saw as an unlimited increase in the powers of the EU, and therefore of the Commission. 
Counterweights of all kind have mushroomed. The ‘pillar structure’ of the Maastricht treaty 
was undoubtedly the first expression of this new tendency: the member states accepted to 
undertake common actions in areas such as foreign policy, security and justice, areas that are 
traditionally the preserve of the state, but only at the cost of a reduction of the role of 
supranational institutions. Even in traditional areas of Community intervention such as the 
internal market, they have appeared reluctant to strengthen the Community structure, which 
has led to the setting up of multiple autonomous bodies. Today, over thirty administrative 
agencies liaise between the Commission and the national governments, in areas ranging from 
the fight against drug addiction, food security and health and safety in the workplace. In other 
areas, the gap between the administrative tasks and the resources allocated to the Commission 
has resulted in the systematic use of subcontractors, which facilitated the fraud and 
mismanagement that brought about the downfall of the Santer Commission (Committee of 
Independent Experts, 1999). Typically, when functional needs for a stronger European 
impetus start to be felt, national governments systematically insist on responding through ad 
hoc structures, rather than entrusting the Commission with new tasks. Over the last two 
decades, we have been witnessing, inter alia, the creation of offices such as the High 
Representative for the CFSP, the presidency for the Eurogroup and the President of the 
European Council.. The Commission has been relegated to a secondary role while the heads 
of state and government assume an overall role of guidance and control. 
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 In the meantime, the Commission has also faced growing pressure on the side of the 
European Parliament. To remedy the notorious ‘democratic deficit’ the European political 
system is said to suffer from, a strong dose of parliamentarianism has been injected at the 
European level; the European Parliament’s financial, legislative and supervisory powers have 
been strengthened. The Treaty of Lisbon describes it as a co-legislator, on the same footing 
with the Council, in most policy areas. Equally importantly,  the Parliament has acquired 
considerable influence over the appointment of the Commission. To strengthen the links 
between the Parliament and the ‘executive’, it has been given the power to elect the 
Commission President and, although its ‘vote of approval’ concerns the college as a whole 
rather than individual commissioners, it has obtained the establishment of  a hearing 
procedure inspired by the US experience, which has enabled it to influence the distribution of 
portfolios within the Commission and even its composition.  
  
 In general terms, the European Parliament’s rise in power has been achieved largely to 
the detriment of the Commission. The generalization of legislative co-decision and the 
parallel development of ‘early agreements’ (Shackleton, 2000; Héritier and Farrell, 2003) 
have constrained the latter’s ability to shape EU legislation resulting from its right of 
initiative, giving rise to concerns in some quarters of the Commission (Costa, Dehousse and 
Trakalovà, 2011).  The Parliament enjoyed decisive influence over some of the past 
legislature’s most controversial proposals, such as the services (or Bolkestein) directive or the 
REACH regulation (Crespy, 2010). In a wide range of areas, ranging from executive powers 
(comitology) to the negotiation of external agreements, the Commission has had to come to 
terms with a vocal partner, eager to secure a seat at the table. Its spending power is now 
subjected to a close scrutiny by the EP’s budget control committee. 
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 In addition to those environmental transformations, the Commission’s services have 
gone through major changes. The forced resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, 
following allegations of mismanagement, has had a lasting impact on the institution. It has 
encouraged the development of a new role model, where the emphasis was no longer on the 
missionary role to be played by an administrative elite in charge of ‘making Europe’, but 
rather on its managerial role, in tune with the world fashion of ‘new public management’. 
Successive reforms of administrative management (the Kinnock reforms) and of recruitment 
procedures, largely inspired by this new model, have been resented by insiders as externally 
imposed (Bauer, 2008; Georgakakis, 2010; see also chapter 8 ).  
 
 Put together, all these factors easily explain why the Commission is widely viewed as a 
power in decline (Kassim and Menon, 2003). This view finds a strong echo in our survey: 
61.7   per cent of our respondents think that the EU has lost ground to national capitals, 58.7  
per cent to the European Parliament; and a majority of them regards the Delors era as a kind 
of ‘golden era’ in which the Commission clearly was Europe’s agenda-setter. But how do 
they react to these changes? On paper, two options seemed possible. Officials from the 
reformed Commission could try to adjust to the new setting and attempt to define a new role 
for themselves, or they  could display a besieged citadel’s attitude, made of attachment to the 
official dogma, nostalgia for a glorious past, and reluctance to accept the more modest role 
they are now proposed.  As will be seen, both trends can be discerned, albeit to a different 
degree, among our respondents. 
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2. WHAT ROLE FOR THE COMMISSION? 
 
 No one will be surprised to find out that there is still wide support within the 
Commission for a vision of the EU in which it is supposed to be playing a key role, without 
being hindered too much by national governments or the EP. The survey shows that amongst 
our respondents there is strong (79   per cent) opposition to the idea that the member states’ 
grip over decision-making should be tolerated and, notwithstanding the  
widespreadsupremacy of the parliamentary democracy model in Europe, a sizable majority 
(57.8 per cent) is of the opinion that the European Parliament should not be given a right of 
legislative initiative. When it comes to the Commission’s own place in the EU system, the 
classical view of the Commission’s policy-making role still holds firmly. While just over half 
accept that policy management and coordination occupy a growing place in the institutions’ 
task, an overwhelming majority (79.8  per cent, with over 40 per cent holding the view 
strongly) declare themselves opposed to the idea that it should primarily focus on managerial 
duties. Nearly two thirds are even convinced that the Commission’s role as policy initiator is 
gaining more importance as a result of enlargement.  
 
 The combination of all these elements might be read as a confirmation of a wide support 
for the good old Community method, in which the Commission has to pull the ropes of EU 
policy-making by bridging the gap between the rival interests of national governments and the 
opposed viewpoints of the Council and the Parliament. At the same time, the dominant view 
seems to be that the Commission should act as honest broker rather than as a hegemon.  There 
is a clear recognition that the Commission should not aspire to unrivalled supremacy in the 
Union, since a relative majority of the respondents who had an opinion (42.6 per cent) declare 
themselves opposed to the idea that it might aspire to become the government of the EU. If 
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one were to stop here, one could easily believe that the average Commission official’s 
conception of their own role has not been dramatically affected by the post-Maastricht 
developments. Yet reality is much more multifaceted than this rapid overview of the data 
suggests. Firstly, as chapter 4 has shown, there is a fair degree of diversity in officials’ images 
of Europe and of  their own role. Even though support for a classical view of the 
Commission’s role remains strong, it coexists with alternative perspectives, be they state-
centric or openly federalist/supranationalist (Hooghe, 2010). Secondly, one may wonder how 
cohesive the group of supporters of the Community method actually is, and to what extent it 
may differ from officials who do not adhere to the classical vision of the Commission. 
 
 To answer these questions, we defined on the basis of the above data an ‘ideal-type’ 
derived from the main tenets of the ‘Community method’ doctrine: the faithful disciple is 
expected to believe that the Commission is something more than the secretariat of most 
international institutions, who are traditionally confined to narrowly defined tasks; in the EU 
context it is expected to be the main agenda-setter, rather than the member states or the 
Parliament. One could have opted for a more elaborate definition of the Community method, 
we deliberately decided to stick to a fairly minimalist acceptation for two reasons. First, 
despite the Commission’s efforts to ‘codify’ the basic tenets of the doctrine, e.g. in its White 
Paper on governance (Commission, 2001), there is no commonly received understanding of 
the concept  Second, adopting a broad definition allowed us to examine how much support 
some ideas, such as the view of the Commission as a would-be ‘government of Europe’, 
enjoy in the CM camp. Adherence to the Community method was therefore defined using 
responses to a question on officials’ views of EU governance,and  singling out two criteria: 
disagreement with the idea  that “member states – not the Commission or European 
Parliament – should be the central players in the European Union” and with the view 
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according to which “the Commission should primarily focus on managing existing policies, 
rather than developing new ones”. As a result, our CM supporters are less prone to 
centralization than the ‘supranationalist’ camp identified by Liesbet Hooghe in chapter .  
Interestingly, the data revealed a strong endorsement of the Community method, so defined, 
among Commission officials: a large number of our respondents (61.7  per cent, 1139 
persons) adhere to the criteria we had set. 
 
   
3. WHO (STILL) BELIEVES IN THE COMMUNITY METHOD? 
 
Beyond the size of the pro-Community method party, it is interesting to know who its 
members are and what are the factors that may shape their view of the Commission’s role. 
The scholarly literature suggests that two paths in particular were worth being explored. 
Firstly, it has been shown that officials’ views on EU governance are generally influenced by 
their national background (Hooghe 2001). One could, for instance, imagine officials from the 
founding countries, immersed in EU policy-making for over half a century, to be more 
favourable to the Community method than newcomers from the countries that joined in 2004 
or later. Similarly, with the Community method having been largely conceived to protect the 
rights of smaller countries from undue pressure from their larger partners, one would expect 
this cleavage to affect officials’ beliefs. Past professional experience could also be relevant in 
at least two ways. Given the official adherence of the Commission hierarchy to the 
Community method, one could expect from an acculturation effect that the longer an official’s 
career in the Commission would be, the more s/he would be inclined to be supportive. In 
contrast, those who have worked in a national administration prior to joining the EU 
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bureaucracy could be hypothesised to find it more difficult to support a system characterised 
by a clear transfer of authority to the supranational level. 
 
Ideological factors are more difficult. From an economic philosophy standpoint, 
European integration can be looked at in radically opposed ways. On the one hand, one might 
expect support for a free market to positively influence support for the Community method, 
which has played a key role in the establishment of the single market; on the other, left of 
centre parties tend today to vest greater hopes in supranational regulation in order to 
compensate the erosion of states’ regulatory powers. On the whole, therefore, we did not 
expect this variable to have a major influence on our findings. In contrast, it would seem 
natural for more socially libertarian officials to be “more comfortable with European identity” 
(Hooghe, 2010).  Further insight on the ideological motivation behind officials’ support for 
the Community Method can be expected to exist among those who joined the Commission 
due to their commitment to building Europe. 
 
In looking at the evidence from the 62 per cent of our survey respondents who adhered 
to our definition of the Community Method, we can test the above hypotheses. Thus, the 
importance of nationality is partially borne out in our data (Figure 1), which show that the 
degree of support for the Community method may vary significantly according to the 
nationality of officials: it is significantly higher among Bulgarians than among Romanians, 
who, despite being regional neighbours entering the Commission at the same time, are at the 
extremes. Some well-established views are re-affirmed by the analysis: Italians, Greeks and 
Belgians tend to be more favourable to the Community Method than, say, the British or 
Swedes. We see there an echo of chapter 4’s findings, in which “supranationalists” dominated 
in the former nationalities and “intergovernmentalists” in the latter.   
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Figure 1 about here 
 
 
Making sense of these differences is difficult. Size does not appear to be a decisive 
factor: there are large and small states among the countries whose officials appear most 
supportive, as well as among more sceptical ones. There appears to be a grouping of  
Southern countries at the positive end, but to speak of a North-South cleavage would be far-
fetched, given the degree of support recorded in Benelux countries or in Germany. In contrast, 
while new member countries appear in both groups, officials from the founding states, with 
the possible exception of the French, are much more likely to be CM supporters.  On the 
whole, those from the ‘old’ EU-15 countries are more supportive of CM than those from the 
newer EU-12 accession countries by an average margin of 5.5 per centi. This appears to 
confirm chapter 8’s findings, which have evidenced a greater adherence to the view that 
national governments should play a key role in the Union amongst officials from those newer 
countries. Yet one should not derive from this that the longer one has been a member of the 
club, the more one is inclined to accept its rules. When disaggregated by the various waves of 
accession, the results do not show any clear trend (Figure 2). While officials from the six 
founding states and Greece suggest above average support, the pattern of support is not 
significant and neither does it reveal a consistent decline over time, with some new members, 
such as Bulgaria and Romania, polarised within the same accession wave (2007).   
 
Figure 2 about here 
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We also tried to identify to what extent people’s experience in the Commission could 
affect their support for the Community method. To this end, we used three variables: the 
directorate general in which they are active, the length of their stay in the institution and ther 
level of seniority.  It is known that the Commission’s role may vary greatly from one area to 
the other and it could be envisaged that this factor might influence officials’ views of the 
world.  Figure 3, however, reveals a high degree of homogeneity across the various 
Directorates General (DGs) within the Commission,ii with only the DG Information Society 
and Media (INFSO) showing significantly higher support than the overall average. Support 
for the CM appears highest in some generalist DGs, the activities of which span across the 
whole range of sectors in which the EU is active (Communication, Secretariat-general, Office 
for infrastructure and logistics), yet this appears contradicted by the lower than average 
attitude in the legal service, in Eurostat, or in the Office for Official Publications (OPOCE). 
Even when the Directorates are grouped into seven functional types (viz. spending, 
regulatory, internal, external, legislative, spending and regulatory, and spending and 
legislative), there is no noticeable difference between their relative support for the CM.iii  It is, 
however, interesting to note that in the sectors in which legislative production has been high 
in the last decade (Grossman and Brouard, 2009), such as internal market, environment and 
justice, the mean of support is above average (65, 65 and 66 per cent, respectively). In 
contrast, it is below average in the Trade and Competition DGs, while the Commission enjoys 
important prerogatives in those two areas. However, the size of the confidence intervals, 
resulting from smaller samples within DGs, makes it difficult to identify a clear pattern of 
behaviour. Of course, the horizontal mobility encouraged by the Kinnock reforms is likely to 
weaken the possibility for DGs  to retain a distinctive culture. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 13 
 
 
Moving on to consider the second set of hypotheses concerning the professional 
experience of these officials, we have investigated the effect of seniority and length of 
service, as well as any prior experience of working in a national administration. In order to 
rule out the possible confounding effect of age, we have analysed individual age and the age 
cohort in relation to the level of CM support.  As it turns out, there is no discernible 
relationship, either for ageiv or age group.v  
 
Probably as a result of the positive relationship between age and level of seniority,vi 
there is no discernible relationship between an official’s current position and commitment to 
the CM,vii  as can be seen in Figure 4.     Similarly, length of service has no discernible 
relationship at all with support for the CM, whether considered in absolute yearsviii  or in 
quartiles.ix  To sum up, officials’ experience in the Commission does not appear to influence 
significantly their perception of the institution’s role. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
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  On the other hand, our data lend support to the idea that prior work in a national 
administration makes it less likely than an official will consider the upward transfer of 
authority to the supranational level in a positive fashion, although the relationship appears 
rather weakx. Supporters of CM were, on average, 4.7 per centxi less likely to have had 
experience in national civil services than other officials. On the whole, therefore, our data 
appears to lend support to the view that officials’ perspectives are more frequently shaped by 
their national origins than by their experience within the Commission (see above, chapter 4).  
 
 
Our third set of hypotheses concern officials’ economic and social/cultural ideology, 
as well as their commitment to integration as an ideal in its own right.  The evidence from our 
survey is that CM supporters are less economically liberal than other officials on economic 
issues by 0.23 points on an 11-point scale,xii whilst acknowledging that both groups are 
marginally to the right of centre (in relation to point 5 on the scale) at 5.40 and 5.63, 
respectively (Figure 5).  However, the heterogeneity of this belief reveals a very wide 95 per 
cent confidence interval for the difference of between 0.04 and 0.42 scale points. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
 
Turning to the social/cultural philosophical beliefs, we again find the CM supporters 
to be more socially liberal than other officials, in this case by a larger margin of 0.42 scale 
points,xiii with a 95 per cent confidence interval ranging from 0.18 to 0.66 points.  On these 
issues Figure 6 shows both groups are clearly to the left of centre (in relation to point 5 on the 
scale) at 3.51 and 3.93, respectively.  Thus, in relation to our original propositions, our 
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evidence would appear to refute the view that the CM supporters are more likely to be free 
marketers, while offering tentative support for the view that they value the regulatory powers 
of the Commission in compensating for the loss of such powers at national level.  
Nonetheless, as we suspected, this variable has not had a major influence on our findings.  
Our data does lend more support for the view that more socially libertarian officials are less 
concerned by the necessity to protect national interests. 
 
Figure 6 about here 
 
 
The commitment to Europe, as a reason for choosing a career in the Commission, 
reveals a stronger link with CM supporters (76.1 per cent) than the others (63.1 per cent), an 
excess of 13 per cent, with a 95 per cent confidence interval of between 8.7 per cent and 17.4 
per cent.  Interestingly, this initial motivation is largely unrelated to their ideological positions 
on the economic or socio-cultural issues. 
 
By building these various possible explanations of why some officials do or do not 
support the Community Method into a multivariate analysis using multi-level linear 
modelling of individuals nested within countries, we are able to identify the key variables (see 
Table 1 in the Appendix).xiv  It turns out that the organisational level (DG) does not add at all 
to the model, whether one looks at each DG individually  or one tries to group them by type 
of activity. In contrast, country-level variables do indeed contribute to our understanding.  
The individual variables that provide most explanation are to do with values, in terms of 
philosophical beliefs, particularly socio-cultural onesxv, and a ‘commitment to building 
Europe’xvi.  Those more to the left on economic and socio-cultural issues are more likely to 
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support the CMxvii, as are those who joined the Commission in order to build Europe, where 
the odds of CM support are almost doubled.  At the country level, additional explanation is 
given by the proportion of protestants within the country, which reduces the support for the 
CMxviii, and the index of multi-level governance, where greater exposure to such structures 
increases CM supportxix.  In other words, it would appear that national experience of multi-
level governance arrangements and the existence of a lower proportion of Protestantism are 
both contributory factors in the support for the CM. Here again, our findings largely echo 
those of chapter 4. 
 
 
4. HOW SPECIAL IS THE ‘COMMUNITY METHOD’ PARTY? 
 
 Having established that the number of ‘faithful believers’ in the Community method 
was fairly high, as one could expect, we attempted to identify more clearly what membership 
in this group entails. Firstly, do supporters of the Community method hold different views 
from other officials on the evolution of the Union? What is their assessment of the impact of 
enlargement or that of the Kinnock reforms on the functioning of the institution?  Secondly, 
what preferences do they have as regards the future of the EU? What is, according to them, 
the most desirable distribution of authority between the EU and its member states or between 
the institutions?  In answering these and related questions, we now consider support for the 
CM as the independent variable to see how well it explains differences in attitude or belief. 
 
A) The decline of the Commission 
First, we looked at the views of officials concerning the evolution of the Union. While 
as noted above our survey identified a clear disenchantment as regards the evolution of the 
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Commission’s political power, it was clearly more pronounced among CM supporters (77.7 
per cent) compared to other officials (64.8 per cent)xx (Figure 7).  Both groups agree, with 
similar majorities of nearly 50 % (allowing for neutral opinions), that there is today a greater 
focus on policy management and coordination, rather than on policy conception. The main 
drain of power leakage is generally identified as being in the direction of the national capitals. 
Here again, CM supporters tend to be more radical : 65.9 per cent of them agree, compared to 
53.6 per cent of the other officialsxxi (Figure 7).  The difference is smaller as regards the 
European Parliament: 60.5 per cent of CM supporter assess that the Commission has lost 
ground to the Parliament, an opinion shared by 55.2 per cent of the othersxxii (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
 
What are the elements which are deemed to be linked to this negative assessment? We 
explored three types of possible sources of the Commission’s weakening: enlargement, which 
has long been expected to complicate relations with the Council as well as the internal 
organization of the Commission; administrative reform, often described as imposed on the 
institution (Georgakakis 2010), and changes in the Commission leadership.  
 
Our survey confirms that enlargement is regarded as a disruptive element by a 
majority of officials. There seems to be no major disagreement between the ‘CM party’ and 
the rest on this assessment. In both groups, about three quarters of the respondents agree that a 
27 member college makes coordination more difficult, although the CM supporters express 
more positive endorsementxxiii.  Likewise, there are no noticeable differences in opinion about 
the fact that enlargement weakened the esprit de corps within the Commission, held by 61 per 
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cent of officialsxxiv, or that its consequences on officials’ career development were not 
handled equitably, also held by a similar proportion.xxv 
 
Concerning administrative reform, the situation is similar. On the whole, our 
respondents are fairly critical of what has been achieved, as while be shown in more detail in 
chapter 7. While they are fairly uncertain as regards the impact of recent reforms, only 
minorities appear convinced that they (23.3 per cent) or their unit (29.2 per cent) have become 
more efficient.  Negative assessments tend to dominate: personnel management has not 
improved (49.7  per cent); resources are not better matched to policy priorities (48.0 per cent); 
almost two thirds of our respondents consider that the new tools have been applied in a 
formalistic way and over 70  per cent that they have led to more red tape. There is only one 
point, the situation of women, where there is a clear majority (58.2 per cent) who believe that 
the situation has been improved.  But our two groups generally agree on this gloomy picture 
of the situation: in some cases, CM supporters are even slightly more positive than other 
officials. In other words, their assessment of the Commission’ loss of authority does not seem 
to have been prompted by their view of the recent administrative reforms.   
 
Moreover, dissatisfaction with the Kinnock reforms is not to be equated with a 
negative assessment of the inner functioning of the institution. While a relative majority 
overall (41.8 per cent, excluding those with no opinion) reckons that coordination between 
DGs does not work effectively, supporters of the Community method are more likely  to 
consider that officials work first for the Commission itself, rather than for their DGxxvi.  Both 
groups recognize that the Secretariat-General has gained ground in recent times, without this 
appearing as a source of major concern; nor are they particularly critical of the cabinets’ role.  
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By contrast, there are clear divergences between the two groups’ views on institutional 
leadership. One set of our questions related to respondents’ appraisal of the performance of 
various presidents and we observe clear differences of opinion at this level, except for the 
Prodi Commission. The Santer Commission came in for the most criticism from the CM 
supporters, arguing that it was weak in relation to setting a policy agenda (56.0 per cent vs 
43.7 per cent)xxvii, managing the house effectively (75.8 per cent vs 66.8 per cent) xxviiiand 
defending the Commission in the EU system (67.7 per cent vs 54.2 per cent)xxix . As to the 
Barroso Commission, 47.1 per cent of the CM supporters were of the opinion that it was fairly 
or very weak in defending the Commission in the EU system, against 37.4 per cent of other 
officials who thought likewisexxx (Figure 8).  In contrast, both groups concur on a more 
balanced assessment of its ability to effectively manage the Commission or to set the Union’s 
political agenda. Unsurprisingly, CM supporters were more positive about the Delors 
Commission, both in terms of setting a policy agenda (99.5 per cent vs 95.6 per cent)xxxi and 
delivering on policy priorities (97.6 per cent vs 95 per cent)xxxii. This does suggest that, while 
all officials have fond memories of the Delors era, it is even more passionately seen as the 
golden age by those who support the CM.  
 
Figure 8 about here 
 
 
B) Views about the future 
Having defined the group of supporters of the Community method by their vision of 
the functioning of the EU institutional system, we could expect it to hold precise views as to 
how European governance should evolve. Several elements are worth mentioning in this 
respect. First, CM supporters, unsurprisingly, would welcome transfers of authority to the 
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European level in several areas (with the notable exception of agriculture where, like other 
officials, they would favour a degree of decentralization). This is a general trend amongst 
Commission officials, as was seen in chapte 4…  There is even agreement between the groups 
on the hierarchy of priorities, with  foreign policy, development, asylum and immigration 
ranking first.  However, it is worthy of note that in every single policy area the CM supporters 
wish to have significantly more decision making at the EU level than do other officials,xxxiii 
from +0.39 scale points for competition and development policies to +0.78 for foreign and 
security policy.  By considering the difference between desired and perceived actual authority 
for each policy area, as in Figure 9, we can see that there is broad agreement about the rank 
order, whilst CM supporters are consistently desirous of more authority at the EU level, 
significantly so for all policy areas except trade and competition. 
 
Figure 9 about here 
 
 
Supporters of the Community method also appear well disposed towards the idea that 
the College of Commissioners’ should one day become the Government of the EU.  Figure 10 
shows how strongly CM supporters, in contrast to other officials, show a distinctly positive 
view of the Commission’s role in this regard.xxxiv The total of favourable opinions in their 
ranks reaches 47.4 per cent, against 26.3  per cent amongst other officials. Yet, even in the 
pro-CM group, support for this option is not clear-cut since the level of negative opinions is 
pretty high (37.1 per cent). In contrast, a strong majority (70.3 per cent) of the members of 
that group (against 55.9 per cent) consider that the Commission’s role as policy initiator is 
made more important by the enlargement of the EU,xxxv as shown in Figure 10. Having had to 
come to terms with an ever more assertive parliament in the last two decades, it could be 
 21 
expected that Commission officials would not be so positive about sharing the Commission’s 
sole right of legislative initiative with the European Parliament.  Indeed, a majority (57.8 per 
cent) are against such a development versus 32.4 per cent in favour. Figure 10 shows that 
there is only marginal difference between our two groups on this issue, with more difference 
being displayed within each group.  
 
Figure 10 about here 
 
 
To summarize, it appears that CM supporters are more likely than other officials to 
support transfers of authority to the EU and that they are eager to see one of the 
Commission’s strategic assets, its right of initiative, consolidated. None of these findings are 
particularly surprising. Yet they should not be seen as an unqualified call for greater 
centralization, nor as a self-interested plea. Over a third of  CM supporters do not subscribe to 
the ideal of the Commission as the government of Europe, and a similar number would 
welcome greater powers being vested in the European Parliament, although only 12 per cent 
hold both positions. In the minds of  those people at least, the Community method should not 
be associated with a centralisation of authority in the hands of the Commission. 
 
In the official discourse, the Commission’s institutional privileges are justified by its 
duty to remain neutral and serve the general interest; the collegiality principle being a key 
element in this respect. This view finds a clear echo amongst supporters  of the Community 
method, for whom services have the responsibility to support politically-agreed positions of 
the College; yet there is weak evidence that they (89.0 per cent) are more likely than others 
(84.6 per cent) to hold this view.xxxvi They also display a relative distaste for state-based 
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considerations at all levels of activity. Thus, asked what they thought about the need to ensure 
that posts be distributed in a geographically balanced basis, they were more likely to disagree 
(51.9 per cent) than other officials (40.6 per cent)xxxvii.  They were also more likely (54.6 per 
cent, against 45.4 per cent for other officials)xxxviii  to find it problematic for officials to 
manage dossiers of particular interest to their member state.  Quite logically, over two thirds 
of them are hostile to the idea of having one Commissioner per member state, preferring a 
smaller and more efficient College. While this feeling is widely shared among the persons 
polled in our survey, CM supporters were even stronger opponents.xxxix 
 
5. CONCLUSION: A CITADEL UNDER SIEGE 
 
There is little doubt that the post-Maastricht period has been a difficult one for the 
Commission, which has lost ground to the other poles of the ‘institutional triangle’, namely 
the Council and the Parliament. This has been the dominant view amongst observers of the 
EU scene for a long time and our survey has shown that it was shared by a vast majority of 
Commission staff. Considering the events in the ensuing months since the survey, and 
particularly the way the Union’s response to the economic and financial crisis has been 
orchestrated, there is little reason to believe that their view will have changed. Yet the 
awareness of the Commission’s declining influence does not appear to have caused a change 
of paradigm, since support for the Community method has remained quite high.  
In some respects, these might appear as ‘non-findings’ since, according to a widespread view 
of bureaucratic politics,  bureaucrats are expected to defend views that serve their own 
interest. Yet one should not forget that the Commission has seen momentous changes  over 
the last two decades. It has witnessed the emergence of powerful rivals and has been 
subjected to major reforms, while at the same time its membership has been changed by the 
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recruitment of nearly 20  per cent of officials from the new member countries. In these 
circumstances, it was far from sure that the average world view within the institution would 
have remained unchanged. 
 
For supporters of the Community method, that system has demonstrated its 
effectiveness and needs to be consolidated, rather than amended. Others may theorize the 
emergence of new forms of governance, but, for the average Commission official, the 
operating system carved by Monnet and his followers still appears better suited to the needs 
of the XXIst century Union than any of its rivals. Furthermore, that view featuring equally 
highly among newcomers and in the newer generation cannot therefore be dismissed too 
lightly as a ‘thing of the past’. However, the picture that results from our survey is more 
complex than it might seem at first sight. Even staunch supporters of the Community method 
are cautious towards the idea of transforming the Commission into a fully fledged 
‘government of Europe’. Similarly, while wary about the European Parliament, they are not 
systematically hostile to an expansion of its role.  
 
Like many of their colleagues, supporters of the Community method consider that the 
enlargement has weakened cohesion within the Commission and they have a fairly negative 
assessment of the impact of the Kinnock reforms. Yet it is mostly in relation to their 
evaluation of their leadership’s ability to defend the Commission in the EU system that a clear 
difference with other officials appears. Altogether, these elements may suggest that, should 
the Commission decide to be bolder and more assertive in its relations with other institutions, 
this attitude would find a positive echo in the Berlaymont building. Whether this can happen, 
and what response it would elicit from the national capitals is, needless to say, quite another 
story… 
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Figure 1 Support for the Community method by nationality 
 
 
 
 
NB  n=1824, with n≥18 for each nationality (except Luxembourg, n=6). The vertical bars represent the mean 
value by nationality and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals. The lighter coloured bars at the lower 
end highlight which nationalities have support profiles that differ significantly below that of the overall mean.  
The overall mean is shown by the central horizontal line, with the 95per cent confidence interval either side. 
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Figure 2 Support for the Community method by date of accession 
 
 
 
NB  n=1824. The vertical bars represent the mean value by date of accession and the error bars the 95 percent 
confidence intervals. The overall mean is shown by the central horizontal line, with the 95per cent confidence 
interval either side. 
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Figure 3 Support for the Community method by Directorate General 
 
 
 
NB  n=1751, excluding n<12 for any DG.  The vertical bars represent the mean value by DG and the error bars 
the 95 percent confidence intervals. The darker coloured bar at the higher end highlights the DG which has a 
support profiles that is significantly higher than that of the overall mean   . The overall mean is shown by the 
central horizontal line, with the 95 per cent confidence interval either side. 
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Figure 4 Support for the Community method by seniority 
 
 
 
 
NB  n=1846. The vertical bars represent the mean value by level of seniority and the error bars the 95 percent 
confidence intervals.  The overall mean is shown by the central horizontal line, with the 95 per cent confidence 
interval either side. 
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Figure 5 Support for the Community method by economic philosophy 
 
NB  n=1782.  The vertical bars represent the percentage at each scale point from 0 (a greater role for 
government) to 10 (a greater role for markets) and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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Figure 6 Support for the Community method by socio-cultural philosophy 
 
NB  n=1783.  The vertical bars represent the percentage at each scale point from 0 (more liberal) to 10 (more 
conservative) and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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Figure 7 Perceptions of the changing power of the Commission by support for the 
Community method 
 
 
 
 
 
NB  1515 ≤ n ≤ 1525.  The horizontal bars represent the percentage of agreement, neutrality or disagreement for 
each question. 
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Figure 8 Views on how well the Barroso Commission defends the Commission in 
the EU system by support for the Community method 
 
 
NB  n=1499.  The vertical bars represent the percentage of agreement or disagreement and the error bars the 95 
percent confidence intervals. 
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Figure 9 Mean difference between desired and perceived distribution of authority 
between member states and the EU in various policy areas by support for 
the Community Method 
 
 
NB   n varies between 1574 and 1624.  The vertical bars represent the mean value on a scale from 0 (exclusively 
national/sub-national) to 10 (exclusively EU).  The error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals around the 
mean for each policy area. 
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Figure 10 Opinions of where power should reside in the EU and its role by support 
for the Community method 
 
 
 
 
NB  1718 ≤ n ≤ 1752.  The horizontal bars represent the percentage of agreement, neutrality or disagreement for 
each question. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 Personal and national characteristics supporting the Community Method 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B 
(SE) 
Wald Odds ratio 
(95%CI) 
B 
(SE) 
Wald Odds ratio 
(95%CI) 
 
Personal 
      
Commitment 
to Europe 
(ref cat: no) 
0.728 
(0.108) 
45.45*** 2.072 
(1.676:2.561) 
0.674 
(0.109) 
37.946*** 1.963 
(1.584:2.432) 
Socio-
cultural 
philosophy 
index 
-0.061 
(0.020) 
9.32** 0.941 
(0.905:0.978) 
-0.067 
(0.020) 
10.876** 0.935 
(0.899:0.973) 
Economic 
philosophy 
index 
-0.066 
(0.025) 
6.89** 0.936 
(0.891:0.983) 
-0.053 
(0.026) 
4.275* 0.949 
(0.902:0.997) 
 
National 
 
      
Protestantism 
(proportion) 
   -0.438 
(0.195) 
5.035* 0.645 
(0.440:0.946) 
Index of 
multi-level 
governance 
   0.014 
(0.005) 
6.853** 1.014 
(1.004:1.025) 
Reduction in 
-2LL 
63.77***   77.147***   
Nagelkerke 
R² 
0.048   0.058   
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 
test (sig) 
0.803   0.989   
n 
(unweighted) 
1794   1794   
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                
i p=0.043; 95CI: 0.1 – 10.8 per cent. 
ii p=0.268. 
iii p=0.546. 
iv p=0.488. 
v p=0.435. 
vi  p<0.001. 
vii  p=0.226. 
viii p=0.842. 
ix p=0.286. 
x p=0.044; phi=0.047. 
xi 95CI: 0.1 – 9.3 per cent. 
xii p=0.018. 
xiii p=0.001. 
xiv The multilevel modelling, carried out using MLwiN (v2.02) with Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods to 
allow Bayesian estimates, shows that no additional variance is found between countries once adjustment is made 
for the fixed variables, implying that a logistic regression would offer an equivalent analysis.  Table 1 shows the 
results of the logistic regression run in SPSS (v17). 
xv One scale point increase in socio-cultural conservatism decreases the odds of being a CM supporter by 6.5% 
(95%CI: 2.7% to 10.1%), holding all other variables constant. 
xvi Those whose reasons for joining the Commission included wishing to build Europe have increased odds of 
being a CM supporter of 96.2%% (95%CI: 58.5% / 142.9%), holding all other variables constant. 
xvii One scale point increase in economic support for markets decreases the odds of being a CM supporter by 
5.2% (95%CI: 0% / 9.9%), holding all other variables constant. 
xviii  A one per cent increase in the proportion of protestants in a country shows a 0.36% decrease in the odds of 
support for CM (95%CI: 0.05% / 0.56%), holding all other variables constant. 
xix A one scale point increase in the index of multi-level governance in a country shows a 1.4% increase in the 
odds of support for CM (95%CI: 0% / 2.4%), holding all other variables constant. 
xx p<0.001; Cramer’s V=0.159. 
xxi p<0.001; Cramer’s V=0.134 
xxii p=0.317 
xxiii p=0.008; Cramer’s V=0.091. 
xxiv p=0.217 
xxv p=0.131 
xxvi p=0.006; Cramer’s V=0.096. 
xxvii  p=0.039. 
xxviii  p=0.014. 
xxix p<0.001.   
xxx p<0.001; Cramer’s V=0.117. 
xxxi p=0.001. 
xxxii p=0.038.   
xxxiii p<0.001. 
xxxiv p<0.001; Cramer’s V=0.201. 
xxxv p<0.001; Cramer’s V=0.174. 
xxxvi  p=0.044; Cramer’s V=0.079. 
xxxvii  p<0.001, Cramer’s V=0.120. 
xxxviii  p=0.001, Cramer’s V=0.106. 
xxxix p=0.007; Cramer’s V=0.092.   
 
